Protecting Smart Buildings

The next frontier of critical infrastructure security

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Who am I?



Global Director Professional Services @SecurityMatters (ForeScout)

- > 13y experience in cybersecurity
- * Fox-IT
- * Netherlands Forensics Institute
- * TNO
- * KPN

Passion for technology

- * Privacy
- * Intelligence
- * MBA



Building Automation Systems - how (in)secure are we?



- * Introduction to (Building Automation) Security
- * Threat landscape: Risks to Building Automation Systems
- * First hand experience
- * What to do now? How to reduce security risks?

About cybersecurity



Cybersecurity is to be prevented from the danger or damage caused by disruption of ICT or misuse of ICT. The risk of damage due to misuse, disruption or interruptions may consist of the limitation of the availability and reliability of ICT, the violation of the integrity of ICT information and the damage to the integrity of that information.

It is about

- Availability
- Reliability
- Integrity

Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum slaat groot alarm

Hackaanval op Kamerleden via MH17mail



AUTORITEIT PERSOONSGEGEVENS





ABN en Rabobank getroffen door DDoSaanval




Why cybersecurity?



Buildings yesterday

1980









Buildings now





Buildings tomorrow





Why cybersecurity for Building Management Systems?





Threat Landscape



What's on the news today?



Hackers Designed a 'Master Key' to Unlock Millions of Hotel Room Doors





Could hackers really take over a

hotel? WIRED explains

Reports this week dainingd an Austrian hotel was hit by ransomware that focked its bedroom doors, but the claims weren't entirely accurate

Hackers once stole a casino's high-roller database through a thermometer in the lobby fish tank



n > Technology Intelligence

Kansowward

CCTV vulnerability could allow cyber criminals to hack video surveillance recordings

November 8, 2016 14:20

Update: Let's Get Cyberphysical: Internet Attack shuts off the Heat in Finland

Why should we worry?





Legacy Systems

- 60% of buildings have systems that are 20 years old
- No encryption
- No authentication

Why should we worry?



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Legacy Systems	Connectivity	
60% of buildings have systems that are 20 years old	More connection = more vulnerabilities	
No encryption	Default open ports	
No authentication	Default passwords	

Why the fuss?










Legacy Systems	Connectivity	Critical Buildings
60% of buildings have systems that are 20 years old	More connection = more vulnerabilities	Airports
No encryption	Default open ports	Data centers
No authentication	Default passwords	Hospital & Public spaces

Why the fuss?





Real-life examples



2012: Target Hack

2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked

2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack

2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria


2017: >70% of all CCTV in Washington DC hacked

2018: Cameras in gymschool Brabant hacked

2018: AIVD hacked 'CozyBear' through CCTV systems







First-hand experience: a cyber security exercise



Exercise setup



Take a small team of security students.



Give them a few controllers and software used in Smart Buildings





BMS

PLCs

Select devices from top vendors and with realistic distribution of firmware versions




Let em play for a few days












How many devices with those 0-days are publicly reachable?








WHAT IS THE DANGER BEHIND EXPOSED DEVICES?




Building Automation Networks






Gain Access






Lateral Movements





Lateral Movements





Attack consequences: Surveillance Systems









Turning off cameras to cover malicious physical actions

Delete recordings that could serve as evidence

Using cameras as botnet (Mirai)



THAT'S NOT IMPOSSIBLE

Attack consequences: Access Control









Add/remove user credentials

Allow access to restricted areas to unauthorized users

Deny access to critical areas to authorized users




WHO LEFT THE DOOR OPENED?

Attack consequences: HVAC









Change the settings for the temperature

Increase temperature to damage medical labs ..

.. or cause data centers to go offline



POWER BELONGS TO THOSE WHO TAKE IT (OFF




How to reduce security risks?




A security strategy for Smart Buildings






A security strategy for Smart Buildings





A security strategy for Smart Buildings







Real-world examples



Setup





Headquarter of a financial institute



About 500 devices in the Building Automation Network



Monitored systems include HVAC, Surveillance and Access Control


Lessons learned: network monitoring



Unwanted SMB traffic in the network

Identification of maintenance operations not adhering to policies (e.g. supplier connecting own laptop to network)

Unwanted communication links between IT and OT networks (firewall misconfiguration)




Lessons learned: asset inventory



Automatic inventory of network assets and their status

Identified hundreds of BACnet devices with only outbound communication flows

Identified multiple vulnerable hosts and controllers with outdated firmware



Lessons learned: anomaly detection



Detect unusual traffic direction (inbound traffic to IP Cameras)

Detect IP-cameras using HD recording (high bandwidth consumption)

Identify out-of-range values for critical variables




Lessons learned: threat hunting



Detect changes to the logic of controllers

Detected usage of UpnP

Detected weak passwords to access IP-cameras






Wrapping up



Key takeaways





Q & A

Stay in touch with our team!

- info@secmatters.com
- @sec_matters
- company/securitymatters



