If high-risk pathogens, toxins and technologies fall into the wrong hands, this can pose a concrete risk. The information and advisory body Bureau Biosecurity of the RIVM focuses on, among other things, laboratories that work with such high-risk pathogens. We spoke with Rik Bleijs from Bureau Biosecurity about the need for awareness of these risks and developments in the field. During LabSafety, Bleijs gave a lecture on this subject.
By: Dimitri Reijerman
There are questions surrounding the theme of Biosecurity. The Biosecurity Bureau focuses primarily on providing information to the target group, as Bleijs explains: “Our bureau was established by the government to increase awareness of risks surrounding laboratory work with high-risk pathogens, specifically focusing on the Biosecurity part; preventing abuse. People must know what they are working with and that certain research material cannot be stolen from the lab. The physical security of laboratories is important for this, but also the awareness among the laboratory employees themselves.”
He gives a practical example: “Certain research may produce good results, but that result can sometimes also be misused after publication. This is called 'dual-use research'. For example, a case occurred in Rotterdam involving research into the H5N1 influenza virus. This research showed which mutations have made the virus air-transmissible, and therefore which changes allow the virus to be spread more efficiently. The knowledge resulting from this research has an important contribution to public health, but could also be misused.”
Laboratory employees are helped on their way via the information on the Bureau Biosecurity website: “To alert lab researchers to the dangers of dual-use research, we have created a number of tools developed. One of the newest tools is the Dual-Use Quickscan. This way, researchers can quickly assess before or during a study whether there may be biosecurity or dual-use risks to their research. We also point out other things they should pay attention to. In certain cases, for example, you will need an export permit. The LabSafety event is an excellent place to raise this topic, because it brings people who specifically work in laboratories. I want them to think about possible other aspects of their research, such as safety risks.”
Underestimation of the risks
Bleijs emphasizes that Biosecurity often receives insufficient attention in practice: “The danger is not only often underestimated, but it is usually also not sufficiently understood by researchers. Last year we held a number of webinars for biological safety officers (BSO). When I ask them whether their fellow researchers are sufficiently aware of dual-use risks and Biosecurity, three-quarters answer that this is not the case.”
“European but also worldwide, awareness still needs to be improved. Worldwide, you see that more and more high-risk labs are now being set up for COVID diagnostics and vaccine development, among other things, so there are more people working with high-risk pathogens, which creates a growing number of safety risks.”
In some European countries, the government takes a different approach than in the Netherlands, says Bleijs: “In Denmark, for example, Biosecurity is very strictly regulated by the government and lab employees need permits to carry out certain types of experiments. But you also don't want to over-regulate. We therefore have a bottom-up approach by creating awareness. Ultimately you end up with management and rules can be drawn up. In this way, Biosecurity becomes a common practice and at the end of the day you apply regulations at government level.”
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